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THE DETERNINANTS  OF EHPLOYEE  PRODUCTIVITY  AND EARNINCS: 
SOHE  NEW EVIDENCE 
AE  S  TRACT 
This  paper  uses data from  a nationwide  sample  of firms  on employee 
wages and characteristics  to reexamine  the determinants  of employee 
productivity  and earnings.  The data include  several measures  of job 
experience,  training,  and both worker  and firm  characteristics  as well as 
subjective  employer  productivity  ratings  and earnings  of workers.  Given 
observations  on the same  individual  at different  points  in time,  we can 
consider  both levels  and changes  in earnings  and productivity,  with  various 
firm—  and  job—specific  effects  eliminated  from the latter. 
The results  show that:  1) Both prsvious  experience  and  tenure in the 
current  job have significant,  positive  effects  on  wages  and productivity. 
Previous  experience  effects are  found  primarily  on levels  of wages  and 
productivity  while tenure  affects  occur  for both current  levels  and changes. 
2) Hours  of training  are positively  related  to productivity  and wage growth 
but generally  not to levels of either.  3) Among  demographic  characteristics, 
we find productivity  growth  and current  productivity  levels  to be slightly 
higher for females while  their  wages  are significantly  lower.  Dther 
determinants  of earnings  and productivity  ratings  (e.g.,  such as various  types 
of incentive  pay and the fraction  unionized)  are considered  here as well. 
Harry  2. Holcer 
Department  of Economics 
Michigan  State  University 
East  Lanaing,  MI  48824 I.  Introduction 
In recent  years, a series  of studies  have been done which empirically 
examine  the determinants  of (as well as the relationship  between)  worker 
productivity  and earnings.  Several  strands have appeared  within  this 
literature.  For instance,  Medoff  and Abraham  (1980, 1981)  have challenged  the 
traditional  "humao  capital"  interpretation  of the experience—earnings  effect 
(i.e.,  that experience  raises  wages  because  it enhances  productivity),  using 
performance  ratings  of professional  and managerial  employees  from the files of 
two large  companies.1  In fact,  they find  no positive  effects  of experience  on 
within—grade  performaoce.  But using different  data,  other  authors  (e.g., 
Btown  (1983), Maranto  and Rodgers  (1984)) have  found more positive  effects  of 
experience. 2 
More generally,  the links  between  productivity  and earnings  and/or  the 
determinants  of each  have been  examined  by  others  as well (e.g., Frank (1984), 
Klein  et.  al. (1987), Weiss  (1988)).  The effects  of pay incentives  on worker 
output and earnings  have  also received  atteotioo,  (e.g., Seller (1984), Lazear 
(1986), Weiss (1987),  Brown  (1987)),  though  we have seen little direct 
evidence  on output  effects  of incentives.4 
One  reason  for some of the conflicting  results  in the papers cited 
above  is that almost  every  one is based  on a unique sample  of workers,  making 
results  from each very difficult  to generalize.  Of course,  this primarily 
reflects  the  fact that measures  of employee  productivity  are generally  not 
available  for most employees  and,  when available,  they  are generally  quite 
specific  to a given  set of workers. 
In this paper, I use data from  a nationwide  survey  of firms  on employee 
wages,  characteristics  and performance  to reexsmine  the determinants  of 
productivity  and earnings.  The data are from  the Employment  Opportunity  Pilot Project  (80FF) Survey  of Firms  in 1980 and l982.  This survey  of about  3400 
firms  (in 1982) includes  a lengthy  set of questions  on the wages and 
charscteristics  of the last worker  hired  by each  firm.  In particular,  one set 
of questions  gauges  subjective  employer  productivity  scores  (on a 0—100  scale) 
at different  points  in time for this most  recent  employee.  These scores will 
be used as our measures  of employee  performance.  In  this study  I consider  the 
determinants  of both productivity  and wsges  between  and within  firms. 
We will  present estimates  of wage equations  in  which  a variety  of 
experience  measures (for both past experience  and tenure on the current  job) 
as well as productivity  scores  sre used as explanatory  variables.  To deal 
with the problem  firm—specific  factors  in the subjective  productivity 
measures,  we estimate  some wage—change  equations  using  data for different 
points  in time on each worker.  We also estimate  productivity  score  equations 
(in both levels  and changes)  to measure  the extent  to which  determinants  of 
wages and of productivity  are the same.  Other  factors which presumably 
influence  both wages  and productivity,  such as  hours  spent in training  and the 
presence  of pay incentive  schemes,  also will be  considered,  as will be a 
variety  of demographic  and firm—level  characteristics.  By estimating  wage and 
productivity  equations  in both levels  and changes  and as functions  of a broad 
range  of determinants,  this paper will build  on previous  work  by John  Barron, 
John Bishop  and others which considered  some of these  same issues.6 
The results  of this paper  can be briefly  summarized  here.  We find that 
both previous  experience  and  tenure  have significant  positive  effects  on wages 
and productivity.  The previous  xperience effects  are mostly  observed  on 
levels of wages  and productivity,  and are  strongest  for experience  that has 
some application  to the current job.  The effects  of job tenure, on the other 
hand,  can be seen on both  current  levels  and changes  of wages  and 3 
productivity.  We also find hours  of training  to be positively  related  to both 
wage and productivity  growth  but generally  not to levels of either.  Finally, 
we find perceived  productivity  growth  (as well as current  productivity  levels) 
to be a bit higher  for female than for male employees  even though  their  wages 
are significantly  lower.  The effects  of pay incentive  schemes and various 
firm characteristics  (such as unionism)  are noted as well. 
The  rest of the paper  is laid out as follows:  Section  TI describes  the 
data  and equations  estimated  in greater  detail, while  Section  III presents  the 
results  of estimated  wage and productivity  equations.  Section  TV contains  the 
conclusion  and  implications  of this work. 
II.  Data amd Equatioms 
The EOPP Survey  of firms  in 1980 and 1982 was administered  in 28 local 
areas  that were sites  for the FOP? experiments  in the late 1970's.  The sites 
are heavily  concentrated  in the South  and aid—West,  and about  half are 
SMSA's.  Large  and/or  low—wage  firms  were overaampled  within  each site. 
The  1982 survey, which  we use below,  asked  two general  types of 
questions  of employers:  one type covering  firm—wide  characteristics  (e.g., 
number of employees,  fraction  unionized,  number  of vacancies,  etc.)  and  the 
other  covering  the last worker  hired during or before  the previous  year.7 
Among  the latter  questions  in the 1982 Survey  were the occupation,  sex, age 
and years of education  of the worker,  as well as his or her wages  — both 
starting  and current  (or most  recent if the employee  was  no longer  with the 
firm).  If  some sort of incentive  scheme  was used  as part of the pay package, 
the type of scheme  (e.g.,  commission,  tips, piece  rate,  etc.) was noted  as 
well. 4 
In addition,  employers  were asked  to score  that employee's  productivity 
on a scale  from  0  to 100, where  the former  would reflect  no productivity  and 
the latter  the maximum  feasible output  on  the  job.  The question  was asked  for 
different  points  in the employee's  tenure  at the firm:  the first  two weeks, 
the third  through  twelfth weeks,  and currently/most  recently.  Separate 
questions  were asked for "typical'  employees  on the same job so that relative 
comparisons  could  be made within  the firm. 
A few different  measures  of employee  experience  are also available  in 
theae  data.  One question  asked  how many months  of previous  experience  the 
employee  had that has  some application  to the current  job.  Presumably,  this 
question  gauges  occupation  and/or  industry—specific  experience.  From the 
question on the employee's  age and years  of education,  we can also calculate  a 
standard  measure  of total  labor market  experience  (i.e.,  age minus  years  of 
education  minus 6).  Finally,  tenure within  the firm  was  specifically  asked 
from those employees  who were  no longer with the firm.  For those  still 
present,  tenure  can be calculated  from the date  of hiring  and the survey  date. 
In addition  to the tenure  measures,  several  questions  were asked  about 
the amount  of time  explicitly  invested  in training  by the new employee.  Total 
hours  of formal and informal  training provided  by  management,  supervisors,  or 
trained  personnel  as well as informal  training  provided  by co—workers  are  the 
ones used  below. 
With all of these  data, we are able to estimate  equations  of the 
following  form: 
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where  w?. and  are starting  and current  (or most recent)  wages  of employee 
i at firm j;  PS 
and PS. 
are starting  (first  two weeks)  and current  (or 
most recent)  productivity  score;  the  are the previous  experience  and 
training  measures  while the  I'. 
include  these as well as job tenure;  the 
are other  individual—specific  measures,  such as education,  sex, and occupation 
(as well as dummies  for the use of the various  incentive  schemes);  while  the 
are  firm—wide  characteristics,  such as site and industry  dummies,  fraction 
unionized  and plant  and firm  size.  Comparisons  of coefficients  from equations 
1)  and 2) thus indicate  the extent  to which  the determinants  of earnings  and 
productivity  are comparable. 
In addition  to estimating  equations  1) and 2) as indicated,  we can also 
add  the PS  as independent  variables  to the appropriate  ln  equations. 
Comparisons  of coefficients  on the  or X'1 
estimated  with and without  the 
ps1 
indicate  the extent  to which  returns  to training,  experience,  tenure, 
etc.  reflect  returns  to productivity.  Comparisons  of the coefficients  on the 
ps1 
with those  from  simple wage equations  containing  these  variables 
similarly  show  us the extent  to which "human  capital"  variables  account  for 
observed  productivity  of individual  workers. 
Of course,  a major  concern  in all of this involves  the subjective 
nature  of the PS1. 
If the managers  at each  firm have different  notions  about 
what a particular  productivity  score  means  in terms of employee  performance, 
these  firm—specific  effects  may be correlated  with  various  regressors  and thus 
may cause  biased  coefficient  estimates  (see footnote  7) in the wage 
equations).  Job—specific  factors  in these  evaluations  (within  I—digit 
occupation  and 2—digit  iodustry)  would  cause  similar problems. 6 
Fortunately,  the multiple  observatione  per worker  and firm on wages  and 
productivity  scores  enable  us to estimate  difference  equations  in which  these 
firm—specific  factors  are eliminated.  Assuming  that  ac = a5,  bc = b5,  etc., 
first—difference  equations  could  be estimated  in which  all time—invariant 
characteristics  of workers  and firms are omitted  as regressors,  leaving  only 
tenure  (as the difference  in experience)  and training  as time—varying  factors. 
However, the assumption  of equal  intercepts  and coefficients  may not 
hold.  For the productivity—score  equations  in  particular,  various  worker,  job 
or firm characteristics  may be associated  with  differences  in employee 
learning  and therefore  in productivity—growth,  or in employer  evaluations  of 
such growth.  If nothing  else, emnloyee  learning  or changes  in employer 
evaldations  over  time would  cause  different  intercepts  between  the PS5 and  PS' 
equations. 
Therefore,  we will present  estimates  of change  equations  below  in which 
intercepts  and time—invariant  regressors  are both omitted and  included,  with 
specification  tests done for the validity  of each.  There are also other  well— 
known  problems  with change  equations  if independent  variables  are measured 
with error,  as subjective  productivity  scores might  well be.8  In this case, 
differencing  compounds  the relative  magnitude  of the error and causes 
downward—biased  estimates  (e.g.,  Freeman  (1984)).  Because  of this 
possibility,  we consider  results  from  equations  in levels  as well  as those  in 
changes  below. 
Another  issue which frequently  arises  in estimating  productivity 
differentials  among  employees  is that of sample  selection,  since  those  hired 
do not represent  a random  sample  of worker  attributes  and the selection 
criteria  are likely  correlated  with the determinants  of productivity  (Brown, 
1982).  This  is somewhat  less of a problem  for a sample  of workers  at many firms  than for those  at one firm,  since  the former  contain  a more random 
sample of employee  charactheristics.  Furthermore,  comparisons  of wage and 
productivity  equations  ought not  to be greatly plagued  by this problem,  since 
similar  selection  criteria  are operating  in both  cases. 
A final  issue  here involves  the fact that both starting  and current 
wages  are observed  in different  years  for different  workers,  since  the most 
recently  hired  worker before  August 1981 might  have been  hired  in earlier 
years  or may have left the  firm before 1982.  Since the early  1980's were 
years  of high  inflation  as well as minimum  wage increasesj0 annual  wage 
increases  due  to these factors  might  cause  upward  biases in the estimated  wage 
effecta  of tenure.  Accordingly,  we include controls  for OPT and minimum  wage 
levels  and  changes  based on the starting  and current/most  recent  years  in  all 
of the equations  estimated  below.'1 
III.  Results 
In  Table I we present means  and standard  deviations  for the wages  and 
characteristics  of the "last worker  hired" by firms  in the 1982 survey. 
The results  confirm  the relatively  low—wage  nature  of the sample, with 
starting  wages  in 1980—81 of about  $5.00 an hour.  Most workers  are high 
school  graduates  employed  in clerical,  sales,  and service  occupations. 
As for productivity  scores, we find  the mean for initial  productivity 
to be close to 50 on  the 0—to—lOO  scale, while current  productivity  is 
substantially  higher.  The average  experience  level  of about  eight  years 
indicates  that  the average  worker here is in his or her mid—twenties  in age. 
About  one—quarter  of total  experience  is considered  "applicsble"  by  managers, 
and  tenure on the job averages  slightly  less than  a year.  Over 70% of these Table  I 
Means  (Standard  Deviations)  for Wages  and 
Characteristics  of "Last Worker  Hired" 
Starting  Wage  5.02  Experience: 
(2.72)  Yrs.  in  Labor Mkt.  8.718 
Current Wage  5.88  (9.099) 
(3.15)  Yrs.  in Applicable  2.505 
Job  (4.489) 
Productivity  Score: 
First 2 weeks  52.72  Yrs. of Tenure  .938 
(25.47)  Mrs. of Training:  (.578) 
Currently  79.85  Formal  8.672 
(17.68)  (38.659) 
Education:  Informal  43.760 
High School  .784  (72.823) 
College  .083  Coworker  36.914 
Occupations:  (126.279) 
Prof./Tech.  .043 
Management  .038 
Clerical  .189 
Sales  .154 
Crafts  .004 
Operatives  .020 
Laborer  .002 
Service  .189 
Missing  .356 
Sex: 
Male  .57 
Female  .43 
Fraction  Unionized:  11 
Still With Firm:  .720 
Use  of Incentive  Pay:  .110 
Notes:  Current'  wage and productivity  score  listed  for individuals  who are 
no longer with the firm  are  those  in effect  at the time of separation 
from the firm. 8 
workers  are still  with their  firms.  Thus, we are primarily  capturing  young 
workers  very  early in their  tenure  profiles  in  this  sampleJ2  This  rather 
non—representative  nature of the sample  must be kept  in mind  as results  are 
interpreted  below. 
We also  find that the average worker  in the sample  is reported  to have 
over 50 hours  of training,  though most of it is considered  informal.  The 
fraction  of workers  covered  by the various  incentive  schemes is also quite 
low. 
Equations for Wage  and  Productivity  Levels 
In Table  2 we present  present  of log  (wage)  equations,  with Table 2a 
containing  estimates  for starting wages  and Table  2b containing  those  for 
current/most  recent  wages.  Experience,  tenure,  and training  variables  all 
appear  in quadratic  form, with tenure  appearing  only in the current wage 
equation.  For both wage measures,  we present  specifications  in which the 
personal  characteristics  and the productivity  scores  first appear  separately 
and then together.  In addition  to the experience/training  variables,  the 
personal  characteristics  include  dummies  for sex, education  and 1—digit 
occupation.  Dummies  for the presence  of incentive  pay are also  included. 
Firm characteristics  include  2—digit  industry,  fraction  unionized,  plant and 
firm size,13  and  site dummmies.  Finally,  each equation  includes CPI  and 
minimum wage level variables  for either  the starting  or current/most  recent 
year. 
The results  in Column  1  for each  wage equation  show effects  that  are 
widely  consistent  with those  in the literature.  Of particular  interest here 
are  the large  estimated  effects  of the experience  measures.  TJe  find  that each 
year of applicable  experience  adds  over  4% to the employee's  wages, while 
general  experience  adds about  1% per year.  The  first year  of job tenure adds Table  2a 
Starting  Wage:  Log (Wage)  Equations 
Starting  Wage 
Experience  .0095  .0094 
(.0027)  (.0027) 
Exp.2  —.0002  —.0002 
(.0001)  (.0001) 
Applicable Exp.  .0424  —  .0407 
(.0046)  (.0046) 
App. Exp.2  —.0010  —  —  —.ooo 
(.0002)  (.0002) 
Tenure  —  —  — 
Tenure2  —  - 
Hrs.  Training: 
Formal  .0682  —  .0811 
(.0528)  (.0530) 
Formal2  —.0002  —.0002 
(.0002)  (.0002) 
Informal  —.0156  —  —.0067 
(.0229)  (.0232) 
Informal2  .0000  .0000 
(.0000)  (.0000) 
CoWorker  .0246  .0294 
(.0267)  (.0267) 
CoWorker2  —.0000  —.0000 
(.0000)  (.0000) 
Productivity 
First  2 weeks  —  .1756  .1934  .0868 
(.0466)  (.0363)  (.03581) 
Current  —  —  —  - 
Male  .197  .207  .196 
(.022)  (.023)  (.022) 
Education: 
ES  .132  .142  .130 
(.027)  (.028)  (.027) 
C  .286  .292  .282 
(.042)  (.045)  (.042) 
Fraction Union  .0034  .0036  .0034 
(.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003) 
ln(Plant Size)  .003  .007  .004 
(.007)  (.008)  (.007) 
Incentive Pay  .050  .057  .053 
(.028)  (.030)  (.028) 
.520  .021  .435  .522 
Note:  Sample  size  is 1169.  All equations  except  those  in  col.  2 also 
include firm  size,  site,  2—digit  industry,  and 1—digit  occupation 
dummies.  Controls  for CPI and minimum wage levels  (in logs) 
for the relevant  year appear  in all equations.  Coefficients  on 
training  and productivity  are multiplied  by 100. Table 2b 
Current Wage:  Log  (Wage) Equations 
Current  Wage 
1  2  3  4 
Experience  .0110  —  .0109 
(.0028)  (.0028) 
Exp.2  —.0002  —.0002 
(.0001)  (.0001) 
Applicable  Exp.  .0411  .0406 
(.0047)  (.0047) 
App.  Exp.2  —.0010  —.0010 
(.0002)  (.0002) 
Tenure  .1101  .0984 
(.0579)  (.0585) 
Tenure2  —.0214  —.0185 
(.0183)  (.0184) 
Hrs.  Training: 
Formal  .1493  .1596 
(.0543)  (.0544) 
Formal-  —.0005  —.0004 
(.0002)  (.0002) 
Informal  .0179  —  .0203 
(.0235)  (.0236) 
Informal2  —.0000  —  —.0000 
(.0000)  (.0000) 
CoWorker  .0122  —  —  .0140 
(.0274)  (.0274) 
CoWorker2  —.0000  —  —.0000 
(.0000)  (.0000) 
Productivity 
First  2wks  —  —  —  — 
Current  —  .2260  .1555  .0783 
—  (.0722)  (.0570)  (.0537) 
Male  .207  —  .225  .209 
(.022)  (.024)  (.022) 
Education: 
HS  .143  .153  .141 
(.027)  (.029)  (.027) 
C  .282  .292  .280 
(.043)  (.046)  (.043) 
Fraction  Union  .0033  .0035  .0033 
(.0003)  (.0004)  (.0003) 
ln(Plant  Size)  .004  .006  .004 
(.007)  (.008)  (.007) 
Incentive  Pay:  .155  .171  .160 
(.029)  (.031)  (.029) 
.528  .017  .438  .529 
Note:  Sample  size  is 1320.  All equations  except  those in col.  2 also 
include  firm  size,  site,  2—digit  industry,  and 1—digit  occupation 
dummies,  Controls  for CPI and minimum  wage levels  (in logs) 
for the relevant  year appear  in all equations.  Coefficients  on 
training  and productivity  are multiplied  by 100. 9 
about  9% to current wage,  though  the  large quadratic  term ensures  that  these 
increases  decline  in subsequent  years.  Even  so,  these large  tenure  effects  no 
doubt  reflect  the concentration  of most of our sample on  the steep, early  part 
of the profile. 
The effects  of formal training  are much larger than those  for informal 
training  by either  management  or  coworkers.  The former are positive  and 
significant  in the equations  for current wages and are marginally  significant 
in  those  for starting wages,  while  effects  for other kinds  of training  are 
not.  These  results are consistent  with our notions  of workers  bearing  at 
least  some costs  of training.  Quite  strikingly,  we find  large  effects  of 
incentive  schemes  on  pay, which  are also much larger  for current  than for 
starting  wages.4  Finally, we find the usual positive  effects  of unionism, 
education  and being  male (the  latter  being worth about  20%) on both  wage 
rates. 
In Cols.  2  of Table 2 we find  the coefficients  from  simple  equations  of 
wages  on productivity  scores, while in  cola.  3 we have added all controls 
except those  for experience  and training.  These  results  show positive  and 
significant  effects  of productivity  scores, with a 100—point  increase (i.e., 
from the lowest  to highest  possible  productivity)  raising wages by 18% to 
23%.  On the other hand, a standard—deviation  rise in initial  productivity 
raises  wages  by only about  15% of a standard  deviation  across  firms,  and 
15  current  productivity  shows  similar  results. 
The  inclusion  of the various  controls  in Col.  3 has virtually  no effect 
on the initial  productivity  coefficient  and a fairly  small  effect on the 
current  productivity  coefficient.  The coefficients  on the controls  themselves 
are also  not greatly  changed.  But when the experience  and training  variables 
are added  in Col.  4,  the magnitudes  of the productivity  score  effects  are 10 
dramatically  reduced.  in particular,  the effect  on starting  wages  is reduced 
to about  half of its previous  size and  that on  current  wages  to about  a third 
of its previous  size.  This suggests  that experience  and training  are strongly 
correlated  with perceived  productivity,  and may account  for much of the 
observed  effect of productivity  on  wages  across firms.  On the other hand,  the 
experience  and training  effects  themselves  are not much changed  by inclusion 
of the productivity  scores.  The  tenure  coefficient  in the current wage 
equation  is reduced  by the greatest  amount,  and the reduction  is only about 
13% of the original  one.  These  results  suggest  that experience  and training 
have important  non—productivity  related  effects  on  wages  as well. 
Table 3 provides  additional  evidence  on the determinants  of perceived 
productivity.  Tn this  table we have estimated  coefficients  of productivity 
score  equations.  The  results show significant,  positive  effects  of applicable 
previous  experience  on productivity  scores,  though  the effect  is much larger 
for initial  than for current  productivity.  A standard—deviation  rise in such 
experience  raises  one's  productivity  score  in the first  two weeks by about  .35 
of a standard deviation  and one's  current  score  by about  .20. 
For  the latter, however,  we find an even larger effect  of tenure  in the 
firm.  A one year  rise in tenure  raises  the productivity  score by 23 points, 
and a standard  deviation  rise in tenure  raises  the current  productivity  score 
by about  three—fourths  of a standard  deviation. 
These  sizable  effects of previous  experience  and tenure on productivity 
therefore  stand  in sharp  contrast  to the results  of Medoff  and Abraham,  who 
found  negative  effects  of experience  on productivity  within  grade.  The 
differences  in results  between  these  studies might reflect  the much  wider 
range of firms  and occupations  that are represented  in these data relative  to 
theirs  (which considered  only professional/managerial  employees  at two Table 3 
Productivity  Score Equations 
First  2 Weeks  Current 
Experience  .171  .110 
(.225)  (.156) 
Exp.2  —.001  —.002 
(.006)  (.004) 
Applicable Exp.  2.073  .749 
(.375)  (.261) 
App.  Exp.2  —.056  —.018 
(.015)  (.011) 
Tenure  —  23.334 
(2.868) 
Tenure2  —5.818 
(.943) 
firs.  Training: 
Formal  —.148  —.069 
(.043)  (.030) 
Formal2  .001  .000 
(.000)  (.000) 
Informal  —.103  —.026 
(.019)  (.013) 
Informal2  .000  .000 
(.000)  (.000) 
Coworker  —.056  —.026 
(.022)  (.015) 
CoWorker2  .000  .000 
(.000)  (.000) 
Male  1.371  —2.759 
(1.775)  (1.234) 
Education: 
HS  1.491  2.842 
(2.191)  (1.526) 
C  4.510  3.066 
(3.457)  (2.404) 
Fraction Union  .034  .016 
(.026)  (.018) 
ln(Plant Size)  —1.050  .833 
(.571)  (.406) 
Incentive Pay:  —3.247  —5.622 
(2.316)  (1.610) 
R2  .155  .155 
Note:  Controls are same as  in cols.  1,  3,  and 4 of Tables 2a,  b. 1l 
firms),  as well as the within—grade  focus  of their work.  However,  the 
evidence  here supports  Medoff  and Abraham  in suggesting  that experience  and 
tenure also have some  effects  on  wages  which are not productivity—related. 
The  large  observed  effects  of the objective  experience  measures  on both 
subjective  productivity  scores  and wages,  as well as the observed  effects  of 
these  scores  on  wages,  also enable  us to have some confidence  that the 
productivity  score  levels  are meaningful  as measures  of worker performance.'6 
On the other  hand,  we find generally  negative  effects  of hours  of 
training  on productivity  scores,  though  they are much less  negative  for 
current  than for initial  productivity.  This  suggests  at least  the possibility 
that,  conditional  on being hired,  the returns  to training  are higher for the 
firm's less initially—productive  workers,  who therefore  receive more of it. 
Alternatively,  these  negative  effects  might  reflect  downward  biases  caused  by 
the correlation  of firm—  or—job—specific  factors  in subjective  productivity 
scores  with these  training  variablesJ7  The incentive  pay variables  also show 
generally  negative  effects,  which might  have similar  interpretations. 
A few other  observed  effects  are worth mentioning  as well.  There  is a 
positive,  insignificant  effect  for male  workers (relative  to females)  on 
initial  productivity  which  becomes  negative  and significsnt  for current 
productivity.  Employer  perceptions  of their  female  employees  thus seem to 
rise significantly  with time on the job, to the point  that they may be 
perceived  more positively  than their  male counterparts.  Of course, both the 
initial  positive effect and the current  negative  effect  of being male  are very 
small,  reflecting  small  fractions  of a standard—deviation  change  in 
productivity.  Much more important  is the contrast  between  the essentially 
comparable  productivity  scores and the much lower wages of women.  While  other 
factors  (such as expected  turnover  differences)  might  conceivably  explain  the 12 
wage effect,  they are unlikely  to be of sufficient  magnitude  to fully explain 
the difference.18 The argument  that  sex differentials  in  wages  reflect 
discrimination  thus becomes  more compelling. 
Finally,  we note positive  but generally  small and insignificant  effects 
of unionism  and worker  education  on their  productivity  scores.  It is, 
however,  noteworthy  that  the positive  union  effects  become significant  (though 
they remain  much smaller  than wage effects  in percentage  terms) when the 
experience  and training  variables  are omitted  from the productivity  score 
equations.19 
Equations  for Wage amd Productivity  Changes 
As noted above,  there  are some fairly  serious  questions  about  the 
validity  or meaning  of these  results.  Variation  in jobs within the 1—digit 
occupation  and 2—digit  industry  categories  for which we control  may render 
some  comparisons  meaningless  and might  account  for a few of the anomalous 
results  above,  particularly  for incentive  pay.  Variation  in firm—specific 
factors  affecting  subjective  employer  evaluations  might  create biases in 
either  direction  in the coefficients  of Tables  2 and 3,  depending  on their 
correlations  with individual  regressors.  Any measurement  error  in the 
productivity  scores would also cause  downward  biases in the magnitude  of the 
coefficients  on these  variables  in  Table  2, which  might explain  their 
relatively  small magnitudes  and their  small  effects on other included 
variables. 
To deal  with the problem  of firm—  and  job—specific  factors  in 
productivity—score  measures,  we estimate  wage—change  and productivity—change 
equations  and present  these  results  in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.  As noted 
above,  differences  in estimated  effects  for current  wages  and productivity 13 
relative to their  starting  values  may eliminate  the justification  for using  a 
strict  first—difference  approach  and msy  therefore  imply  the use of intercepts 
and tine—invariant  regressors  in these equations.  Accordingly,  we present 
estimates  in Tables  4 and 5 of equations  containing  intercepts.  Only the 
time—varying  regressors  (i.e.,  tenure  and hours  of training)  are included  in 
the first  few specifications  of the wage change  equation,  while  eventually  the 
others  are  added  as well.  Changes  in productivity  scores  are alan used as 
regressors  in Table  4 and as dependent  variables  in  Table  5.  The first— 
difference  versions  of the wage equations  do, however,  appear  in the Appendix. 
The  results  of Table  4 show  that tenure  and training  both have 
significant,  positive  effects  on wage growth.20 As before,  the effects  of 
formal  training  are  larger than those  of informal  training,  while  both types 
of training  by management  have  nnre positive  effects  than time  apent with 
coworkers.  Interestingly,  training  explains  little of the  tenure  effect on 
wage growth.  We alsn find that wage growth  is positively  affected  by 
incentive  pay  schemes.  On the other  hand,  previous  experience  bears  no 
relationship  to wage growth. 
When changes  in productivity  scores  are added  to the wage  change 
equations,  we again find positive  and significant  effects,  with the magnitudes 
somewhat  smaller  than  they were in comparable  wage level  equations.  However, 
the presence  of change  in experience  (i.e.,  tenure)  in these equations  lowers 
the magnitude  of the productivity  effect  by a much smaller  amount  than did 
experience  in the wage level  equations.  In this case,  tenure  and training 
hours  account  for 10—15%  each of the magnitude  of the productivity  effect, 
while all other controls  account  for little  more.  Conversely,  productivity 
changes  account  for about  10% of  the estimated  tenure effects on wage changes. :nt  ercep  t 
hange  in 
Productivity 
2xperience 
—  —  .0016 
(.0013) 
—  —  —.0000 
(.0000) 
—  —  —.0014 
(.0022) 




















—  —  .013 
(.013) 
—  —  —.005 
(.021) 
—  —  —.000 
(.000) 
—  —  .002 
(.004) 
—  —  .104 
(.014) 





—  —  —.0000 
(.0000) 
—  —  —.0004 
(.0022) 
























—  —  .012 
(.013) 
—  —  —.004 
(.020) 
—  —  —.000 
(.000) 
—  —  .001 
(.004) 
—  —  .106 
(.014) 
.129  .152  .212 
Note:  Sample  size is 1169.  Controls are same as in Table  2 and 3,  except 
that the CPI and  minimum wage  variables  now reflect  changes (i.e., 
log(1 + % change)  rather  than levels.  Dependent  variable  is 
log(current/starting  wage). 
Table  4 
Wage Change Equations: 
With Intercept  and Fixed Characteristics 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
.040  .026  —.023  .070  .030  .020  —.027 







—  .1073 
(.0272) 
—  —.0220 
(.0087) 
.1191  .1216 
(.0272)  (.0270) 
—.0241  —.0257 
(.0087)  (.0086) 
—  .1024 
(.0261) 
—  —.0002 
(.0001) 
—  .0332 
(.0113) 
—  —.0000 
(.0000) 
—  —.0138 
(.0138) 
—  .0000 
(.0000) 















Fraction  Union 
ln(Plant  Size) 
Incentive  Pay 
—  —  .0979 
(.0260) 
—  —  —.0002 
(.0001) 
—  —  .0276 
(.0113) 
—  —  —.0000 
(.0000) 
—  —  —.0173 
(.0132) 
—  —  .0000 
(.0000) 
.116 14 
We  also  note  that  the  intercepts  in many of these  equationa  are 
significant,  while the  time—invariant  regresaors  of Cols.  3 and 7 are mildly 
significant  as well.21  But as these  are not  significant  in  all  cases, we 
consider  the results  of first—difference  wage equations  in the Appendix  as 
well.  While the magnitudes  of most affects are larger  in these  equations,  the 
qualitative  results  are very similar.  Productivity  changes  now account  for 
about 14% of the wage change—tenure  effect. 
In Table 5,  we once again  find significant  and  positive  effects  of 
tenure on productivity  score  changes.22  The magnitudes  are somewhat  smaller 
than were the  comparable  ones  in Table 3,  but  they remain  quite large.23  But 
in contrast  to the earlier  productivity  score  equations,  we now find that bott 
formal and informal  training  also have significant  positive effects  on 
productivity  changes,  even after  controlling  for job  tenure.  As was  suggested 
before,  female  emoloyees  show significantly  higher  productivity  growth  than di 
males,  though  there  is no significant  growth in their  relative  wages.  The 
large  and significantly  ppsitive  intercepts  in all of the equations  suggest  a 
rise in employer evaluations  of their  employee's  performance  over time,  even 
after  controlling  for tenure. 
In sum,  the estimates  of wage—change  and productivity—change  equations 
reinforce  our earlier findings  that tenure  raises  both productivity  and 
earnings,  though  it also has effects on earnings  which  are  independent  of 
productivity.  We also find  that hours of training  contribute  significantly  tc 
wage and productivity  growth,  even if they  are not related  to the levels of 
either;  and  that  sex differences  in wages  are not reflected  in productivity 
levels  or growth. 
Before concluding,  we note again that the presence  of measurement  errot 
in the  subjective  ratings  may mean that wage change  equations  compound  any 
downward biases that existed in the estimated  productivity  score  coefficients Table 5 
Productivity  Change Equations: 
With Intercepts  and Fixed Characteristics 
1  2  3 
rItercept  16.000  12.510  6.639 
(2.438)  (2.458)  (3.709) 




Applicable  Exp.  —1.344 
(.360) 
pp. Exp.2  .639 
(.015) 
Tenure  17.035  16.333  14.625 
(4.067)  (4.005)  (3.957) 
renure2  —4.092  —3.998  —3.177 
(1.339)  (1.318)  (1.302) 
qrs. Training: 
Formal  7.295  8.143 
(4.226)  (4.193) 
Formal2  —.031  —.036 
(.013)  (.013) 
Informal  8.671  7.636 
(1.824)  (1.813) 
Informal2  —.011  —.010 
(.003)  (.003) 
CoWorker  5.266  3.201 
(2.139)  (2.112) 
CoWorker2  —.006  —.004 
(.002)  (.002) 
Male  —  —4.163 
(1.703) 
Education: 
HS  1.532 
(2.105) 
C  —1.531 
(3.358) 
Fraction UnIon  —.016 
(.025) 
ln(Plant  Size)  1.820 
(.560) 
Incentive  Pay  —2.406 
(2.  222) 
.023  .062  .126 
Note:  Controls  are  same as in previous  tables.  Dependent  variable  is the 
difference  between productivity  scores currently  and those of first 
two weeks. 15 
of wage level  equations.  The estimates  of Tables  4 and  5 might therefore  be 
viewed as lower  bounds to the true effects of productivity  on wages and on the 
wage—tenure  relationship.  Furthermore,  the  similarities  between productivity 
effects on wages  and experience  in equations for levels  and these for changes 
again suggest  that  the subjective  productivity  scores  used in the analysis 
here are meaningful as measures of worker  performance. 
IV.  Comclmsfom 
This  paper  uses  data  from  a nationwide  sample  of firms  on employee 
wages  and characteristics  to reexamine  the determinants  of employee 
productivity  and earnings.  Productivity  is measured  by subjective 
productivity  ratings  of recently  hired workers by their  employers.  The 
primary determinants  of productivity  and earnings that we consider  are 
enployee  experience  and tenure,  hours of training,  pay incentive  schemes, and 
various demographics  characteristics  of workers.  Wage and productivity  score 
equations  are estimated  in changes  as well as levels  to eliminate  job— and 
firm—specific  factors  in these  productivity  scores. 
The results  show that both previous experience  and  current  job  tenure 
have positive and significant  effects on wages and productivity.  These 
results  appear  in levels  of wages and productivity  for previous  experience  and 
in both current levels and changes  of wages  and productivity  for  job tenure. 
A good deal of the wage—productivity  relationship  is accounted  for by 
experience,  and the  effects  are largest  for experience  that has  some 
application  to the current  job.  On the other  hand,  experience  and tenure  have 
additional  effects on wages  which appear to be independent  of their 
productivity—enhancing  effects. 16 
We also  find that hours spent in training  have positive  effects on both 
wage and productivity  changes, though  productivity  levels  suggest  that less 
initially  productive  workers may receive  more hours  of training  than do their 
counterparts,  within firms.  The various pay incentive  schemes,  which 
generally  have large positive  effects on wage levels and changes,  do not have 
similar positive  effects on productivity  levels  or changes. 
Finally, we find various other effects  of individual  and  firm 
characteristics. In particular,  female  employees  show greater  productivity 
growth then do male employees,  and  their  current  productivity  levels  are 
slightly higher  as well.  These  results  for females  and males  stand  in sharp 
contrast to their  relative  wage levels,  which are significantly  higher for 
men.  The  evidence  that higher  wages for male workers reflect discrimination 
is therefore  strengthened.  We also find positive  effects  of unionism  on 
productivity  scores of workers,  though  in percentage  terms  these effects  are 
much smaller than are the effects of unionism on  wages. 
A  few caveats must be kept in mind as these  results are reviewed.  The 
exact  nature and meaning  of the subjective  productivity  score  variable remain 
questionable,  and  this unusual sample  of young and  inexperienced  workers must 
be noted as well.  Still,  the results  here strongly  suggest  that wages are 
affected  by a wide range  of both productivity—  and non—productivity—related 
factors, including  discrimination  and unionism.  The potential  for training to 
raise  both wages and productivity  is also documented.  More study  of these 
links  between productivity  and  earnings  as well as the  determinants  of each is 
certainly  warranted. 17 
FOOTNOTES 
1The  seminal  piece  in the  literature  which stresses  the productivity— 
enhancing effect  of experience  is Mincer (1974).  But more recent  theoretical 
formulations  stress  that  profit—maximizing  firms  may choose  earnings profiles 
that are  steeper  than productivity  profiles  with respect to experience  (e.g., 
Lazear (1979)). 
A somewhat different  question  has recently been raised  about  whether 
the returns to job  tenure  really  reflect  differences  in "match quality"  across 
people  and jobs  as opposed  to a return to tenure for people  on the same jobs 
(Abraham  and  Farber,  1987).  If,  in fact,  those  with longer  tenure have higher 
quality  matches, we would expect  to see higher  productivity  among  those  with 
longer  tenure. 
2Maranto and Rodgers find that  the experience  of government  officials 
in monitoring firm  compliance  with minimum wage laws raises their  productivity 
in uncovering violations.  Brown finds  that most of the wage—tenure  profile is 
explained  by the time which individuals  report  that it takes  for them to 
complete training  and become fully  productive  on their  jobs. 
3Frank  analyzes  the distributions  of sales  and earnings  among 
automobile  dealers  and  realtors,  finding  a narrower spread  in the latter  than 
the  former.  Klein et. al. and Weiss use data on output for production  workers 
at a large  firm to analyze  the effects  of gender and high school  graduation  on 
observed  output and quits.  Another strand  of this  literature  analyzes the 
union effect  on productivity  and compares it with the wage effect.  This 
growing literature  is summarized  in Freeman  and Medoff (1984). 18 
4Lazear  and Brown present  theoretical  arguments  on firm  choice between 
straight time and incentive  pay,  and Brown  provides  empirical  evidence as 
well.  Seiler  and Weiss pr?vide evidence  that individual  incentives  (relative 
to straight time pay or group  incentives)  raises  the variance of earnings 
across individual  workers  and  infer  effort/output  effects from this. 
5The  1982 wave of the survey  was developed  at the National Center  for 
Research on Vocational  Education  and administered  by Gallup,  Inc. 
6These  papers  include  Barron et. al.  (1986),  Barron  and  Lowenstein 
(1986),  and Bishop (1987,  1988).  Results  are  discussed  below  where relevant. 
7The question  calls for  the last  employee  hired  on or before  August 
1981.  Approximately  20 workers in this sample  were,  in fact,  hired  during 
1982.  Frequencies  of workers hired in 1979,  1980,  and  1981 were 99, 206,  and 
1110. 
8The point that  subjective  performance  ratings  are characterized  by a 
fair amount  of randomness  is made in Hunter (1983). 
90f  those who are no longer  with the firm,  19 left in 1980,  167  left  in 
1981,  and about  190 left  in 1982.  All who are still  with the  firm report 
wages for 1982. 
10CP1  levels  (using  1967 as the base year) were 217.4,  246.8,  272.4, 
and 289.1  respectively  for the years  1979—82.  Minimum  wages set by the 
Federal government  were $2.90  in 1979,  3.10 in 1980,  and  3.35  in 1981. 
11The  coefficients  on the log(CPI)  levels  and changes are significantly 
less than one in most wage level  and change  equations.  The data thus  reject 
deflating  as a means  for dealing  with nominal wage adjustment.  The use of 
year—level  or year—change  dummies  in the appropriate  equations  instead of CPI 
and minimum wage variables  led to fairly comparable  results  with regards  to 
the  effects  of experience  and productivity  on wages. 19 
12The youthfulness  and  low experience  levels  of the sample  reflect  not 
only its  focus  on low—wage firms but also the  fact  that a sample  of last—hired 
workers will overrepresent  high turnover,  low duration  workers  and jobs within 
firms.  This must be kept  in mind as results  are interpreted  below. 
13Plant  size actually refers  to company employment  levels within the 
site,  for which exact  magnitudes  were gauged in the survey.  Total company 
employment (i.e., both within  snd outside  the  site)  was  then  gauged using  a 
set of categories  i.e.,  1—100,  100—250,  250—500,  500—2000,  and 2000+.  We use 
the  continuous  within—site  measure  and well as dummy variables  from total  firm 
employment. 
1Since  we focus  here on wage levels  rather  than variances,  these 
results  are a bit different  from those  of Seiler  and Weiss (see footnote 5) 
who find  higher variances  when using  individual  level  incentives,  It is, 
however, quite  plausible  that the means  and variances  of worker compensation 
are positively  correlated. 
15These  magnitudes  are  roughly  similar  to those  found  by Bishop (1987) 
with these data.  He focused  on relative  wage and productivity  differences 
between employees  within firms, using a relatively  small  sample of workers 
with vocational  education (in addition to the  'last  worker  hired")  about  whom 
questions  were asked in the EOPP Survey. 
is, of course,  possible that the correlations  between  wages and 
productivity  scores  are explained  by a tendency  of supervisors  to rate higher 
wage employees  with higher scores,  thereby rationalizing  the higher  wages 
which they receive  anyway.  The experience—productivity  effects  might also be 
explained by a positive  age—bias in scoring,  as suggested  by Rothe (1949). 
17The case for negative selection  into training is somewhat  weakened by 
the positive correlations  between  hours of training  and levels  of education 20 
observed for  these workers, though  correlations  with previous  experience  were 
negative.  Both results  are consistent  with those  observed  by Mincer (1988) 
and Lillard  and Tan  (1986).  Since  the estimated  performance  effects  are 
within 1—digit  occuption,  positive  correlations  with education  and negative 
ones with productivity  are not implausible. 
18The presence  of sex differentials  in  wages  that are not observed in 
productivity  has been noted by Klein et. al.  (1987).  Differential  quitting 
behavior  between  males  and females  has been noted  by Viscusi  (1980)  and Matzen 
(1986).  However, the differentials  calculated  here  already  control for 
currently  observed tenure  as well as training.  It  is thus unlikely that 
expected tenure  differentials  could  fully  explain  the  observed  wage effect. 
19Unionism  here is positively  (though weakly) correlated  with previoua 
experience  (p=.  07  for applicable  and .03 for general  experience)  and 
negatively correlated  with hours of training  (  p=—. 05  for  informal  training 
by management  and —.03 for that with coworkers).  The latter result  is 
consistent  with Mincer (1983).  When experience  and  training  variables  are 
omitted from productivity  score  equations,  the coefficient  (and standard 
error)  on collective  bargaining  are  .053 (.028)  and  .032 (.019)  for initial 
and current  productivity  scores  respectively.  Moving from 0 to 100% unioniam 
would thus  raise wages by about 33%  (Table  2) and productivity  by about  10% 
initially  and 4% currently. 
20The positive  effects  of training  on both wage and productivity  growth 
have been noted  in these  data by Barron  et.  al.  (1986)  and elsewhere  by Mincec 
(1985)  and Lillard  and Tan (1986). 
24he  F—value  of the entire set of time—invariant  regressors  is 3.91 
(F05 
= 1.27)  in the wage change  equations. 21 
22Effects  of tenure  on changes  in productivity  scores in these  data 
have been noted by Bishop (1988). 
one  standard—deviation  change in tenure leads  to a change in 
productivity  growth  of about  .41 of a standard  deviation. 22 
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Wage Qiange  Equations: 
First  Differences 
1  2  3  4  5 
Change  in 
Productivity  .1147  .0789  .0675 
(.0173)  (.0177)  (.0180) 
Tenure  .1666  .1528  —  .1411  .1342 
(.0194)  (.0196)  (.0201)  (.0201) 
Tenure2  —.0386  —.0351  —.0324  —.0308 
(.0065)  (.0065)  (.0066)  (.0066) 
firs.  Training: 
Formal  .1038  .0988 
(.0261)  (.0260) 
Formal2  —.0002  —  —.0002 
(.0001)  (.0001) 
Informal  .0361  .0295 
(.0112)  (.0112) 
Informal2  —.0003  —  —  —.0000 
(.0002)  (.0001) 
CoWorker  —.0129  —  —  —.0168 
(.0132)  (.0132) 
CoWorker2  .0000  —  .0000 
(.0000)  (.0000) 
.529  .545  .518  .537  .550 
Note:  Same as Table 4. 